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NOTES
DOES THE DEFENDANT HAVE A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS'
PRIOR VOTING RECORDS?
Defendant was indicted for distribution of heroin. Prior to the voir
dire examination, defense counsel filed a motion requesting that the state
furnish the defense with a list containing prospective jurors' voting records
in previous criminal trials.' When the trial judge ordered the list to be
given to the defendant, the state moved for a contradictory hearing. After
the hearing the trial judge renewed his order and the state appealed. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state was not required to give the
list to the defendant, but that the defendant should be entitled to elicit the
information from the prospective jurors on voir dire. State v. Holmes, 347
So. 2d 221 (La. 1977).
The rationales for disallowing certain questions on voir dire have
changed little over the years in Louisiana. 2 It is agreed, for example, that
questions that seek to commit a venireman to a position on the law or facts
to be presented at trial are impermissible.3 For this reason many hypothet-
ical questions bearing a similarity to the facts at issue are not allowed. 4 A
line of questioning that is lengthy or repetitious may be denied as being
unduly burdensome on the court's time.5 Some questions may be forbid-
den because they are in an improper form-confusing, 6 "loaded",7 too
broadly phrased,' not in legal form,' or inflammatory."° Finally, certain
I. The State obtained the information contained in its "jury book" by polling
jurors after criminal trials and sending the results to the secretary of the Trial
Division who in turn distributed the information to the Sections of Court to be
logged on each juror's venire. The polling of a jury is allowed by Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 812. It is noteworthy that the statute provides for no
other method of discovering a juror's vote in a criminal case. See text at note 52,
infra.
2. Martin, Voir Dire Examination As To Fundamental Rules of Law, 33 LA.
L. REV. 449, 451 (1973).
3. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 325 So. 2d 802 (La. 1976); State v. Brumley, 320
So. 2d 129 (La. 1975).
4. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 230 La. 1059, 89 So. 2d 898 (1956); State v.
Smith, 216 La. 1041, 45 So. 2d 617 (1950).
5. See, e.g., State v. Landry, 316 So. 2d 738 (La. 1975); State v. Bell, 263 La.
434, 268 So. 2d 610 (1972).
6. State v. Harris, 51 La. Ann. 1194, 25 So. 984 (1899).
7. State v. Knight, 296 So. 2d 800 (La. 1974).
8. State v. Johnson, 301 So. 2d 609 (La. 1974).
9. State v. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673 (1859); State v. Bennett, 14 La. Ann. 651
(1859).
10. State v. Smith, 216 La, 1041, 45 So. 2d 617 (1950).
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questions have not been permitted because they do not further the exami-
nation of a prospective juror's qualifications." Questions concerning a
venireman's knowledge of the law are not allowed because of this irrele-
vancy. 12
In most instances, cases have been consistent in their rationales, but
seemingly inconsistent in their results. Denying defense counsel the op-
portunity to question prospective jurors about the presumption of inno-
cence was held to be reversible error in one case. 3 The same or similar
questions in different circumstances, however, may be properly denied. 4
In part, this particular inconsistency is due to the courts' recognition that
each prosecution has a life of its own and that questions, proper in one
case, may be improper in another simply because different factors are
present.15 This case-by-case approach to the scope of voir dire must be
kept in mind as tempering all generalizations in the area.
State v. Hills16 is the leading Louisiana case on the permissible scope
of voir dire. In Hills, defense counsel was denied the right to ask the
question, "Do any of you gentlemen belong to any religious or segrega-
tion groups?"' 7 The supreme court, on rehearing, reversed the defend-
ant's conviction. Recognizing the necessarily close relationship between a
full voir dire and the intelligent exercise of the right of peremptory
challenge, the court in Hills held that a wide latitude should be allowed
counsel in examining prospective jurors on voir dire.' 8
11. See note 34, infra, on statute limiting voir dire to this purpose. See text at
note 42, infra, on irrelevancy as it relates to the instant case. For cases on
irrelevancy see, e.g., State v. Clark, 325 So. 2d 802 (La. 1976) (whether fact that
accused had served and been wounded in Viet Nam would influence juror); State v.
Jones, 320 So. 2d 182 (La. 1975) ("What would your feelings be if your son started
taking out a colored girl?").
12. State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976); State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249
So. 2d 143 (1971); State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928).
13. State v. Crittle, 263 La. 418, 268 So. 2d 604 (1972); but see State v. Conrad,
304 So. 2d 318 (La. 1974).
14. State v. Calloway, 324 So. 2d 801 (La. 1976); but see State v. Nero, 319 So.
2d 303 (La. 1975); State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So. 2d 143 (1971).
15. Compare State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924) and State v.
Iverson, 136 La. 982, 68 So. 98 (1915), with State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205,84 So. 589.
(1920). On the need for individualization of cases generally, see Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1972).
16. 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12 (1961).
17. Id. at 356, 129 So. 2d at 17.
18. Id. at 396, 129 So. 2d at 31. Hills is not the first case to use such language,
however; see State v. Shields, 33 La. Ann. 991, 994 (1881). See generally R. MARR,
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE IN LOUISIANA 691 (1923).
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The earliest Louisiana case to reach a decision on the propriety of a
question relating to a venireman's prior jury experience is State v.
Swain. 19 Citing the former Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,2' the
court held that questions concerning a prospective juror's prior jury expe-
rience are beyond the proper scope of voir dire because they are unrelated
to discovering his qualifications. A number of later cases relied on Swain
to prohibit questions concerning prior jury experience. 2 However, the
defense did not argue in any of these cases that the state possessed or
intended to use such information.
In the recent case of State v. Wright22 the Louisiana Supreme Court
was first presented with the question whether the defense could ask
questions on voir dire concerning a venireman's prior jury experience
when it was alleged that the prosecution possessed such information. In
Wright the trial court denied the defense attorney's request to pursue such
a line of questioning. 23 Arguing that the defense was prejudiced by these
limitations on questioning, defense counsel requested a reversal and ac-
cess to the prospective jurors' prior voting records in the state's posses-
sion. The supreme court affirmed, holding that there was no showing of
undue prejudice to the defendant or of the state's use of the information in
19. 180 La. 20, 156 So. 162 (1934). The question disallowed was, "What capital
case did you serve on?"
20. Former Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 357 read: "The
purpose of the examination of jurors is to ascertain the qualifications of the juror in
the trial of the case in which he had been tendered, and the examination shall be
limited to that purpose." Former article 172 officially required that in order to
qualify as a juror a person must: be a citizen of the state and resident of the parish in
which the court is held, be at least twenty-one years old, be able to read and write
English, not be under interdiction or charged with any offense or convicted of any
felony, and have a good character. Present article 401 does not substantially alter
these qualifications. See note 34, infra, for former article 357's present counterpart.
21. State v. Roquemore, 292 So. 2d 204 (La. 1974); State v. Spencer, 257 La.
672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705, 198 So. 2d 897 (1967). In
Roquemore, the supreme court was asked to reconsider, in light of its expansive
language in Hills, jurisprudence which denied counsel the right to ask questions
concerning a prospective juror's prior jury experience. Despite the language used in
Hills and its apparent approval in comment (d) to article 786 of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure, the court in Roquemore distinguished the cases and refused
the questions of defense counsel as irrelevant. 292 So. 2d at 206.
22. 344 So. 2d 1014 (La. 1977).
23. In response to questioning, the juror admitted having served on a jury
before and disclosed the name of the judge, after which defense counsel asked,
"During the course of the trial that you have previously served on, was there an
issue of question of identification of the perpetrators?" Id. at 1017. The court
disallowed this question.
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jury selection and that, in any event, the defense attorney had not directly
attempted to elicit the venireman's prior vote during voir dire.
A number of federal courts have been presented with the issue
whether questions concerning a venireman's prior jury experience have
been properly refused by trial judges in cases in which the state did not use
a "jury book." 24 Without exception the courts have ruled that forbidding
such questions was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It should be
noted, however, that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governed
these holdings and that these rules arguably confer a greater degree of
discretion upon the trial judge than do Louisiana's rules.25
One federal court has ruled on whether defendant may inquire in voir
dire about a venireman's prior jury experience where it was alleged that
the state had access to such information.2 6 The court held that voir dire had
not been improperly limited and that an unfair advantage was not given to
the state because of its use of a jury book. The court, however, was careful
to limit its holding to the facts in the case, stating that the judge exhibited a
high degree of fairness. 27
The jurisprudence discussed above indicates that appellate courts
have not considered trial judges to have abused their discretion by forbid-
ding questions on a venireman's prior jury experience. However, these
same courts have indicated that trial judges possess a great deal of
discretion either to limit or to expand the scope of voir dire, and it may be
assumed that judges in the exercise of this discretion may allow such
questioning. These decisions also indicate that while the state's access to
such information is one factor to consider upon appeal, such access does
not by itself make the denial of defendant's questions an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
In the instant case, the defense relied solely upon constitutional
rationales to compel disclosure of the jury book.8 Defense counsel argued
24. United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Ruggier, 472 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973); Varamontes-Medina v. United States, 411
F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1969); Deck v. United States, 395 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1968); Bellard
v. United States, 356 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1966); Alvarez v. United States, 282 F.2d
435 (9th Cir) 1960); Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1959).
25. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure article 24(a), for example, gives the
judge alone the right to ask the jurors questions he thinks proper on voir dire after
requesting that the parties submit to him the questions they would like asked.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 756 gives the court, the state and the
defendant the right to examine prospective jurors. See note 34, infra.
26. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958).
27. Id. at 281.
28. 347 So. 2d 221, 222 (La. 1977). The opinion is unclear on whether defendant
relied upon the Louisiana or the federal constitution or both.
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that the information's unavailability to the defendant 29 combined with the
state's admitted use of the information to select jurors, would violate due
process and the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury drawn from a
cross section of the community. The state responded that the list was
privileged from discovery because it was the "work product" of the
district attorney who had compiled it.
The court avoided the arguments by holding that the defendant, while
not having a right to obtain the records, should be allowed access to the
information contained in the records. The court stated that this could be
accomplished on voir dire by allowing defense counsel to ask the prospec-
tive jurors the questions necessary to elicit the information. In light of this,
the court held that the defendant's claims were premature.3" Since the
defendant would have access to the information on remand, no constitu-
tional or statutory rule required the state to disclose the list, and the court
therefore held that the trial judge had improperly ordered its disclosure. 31
In reaching this decision, the court specifically overruled three prior
decisions which had denied defense counsel the right to ask veniremen on
voir dire questions relating to their previous experience on a jury. 32 The
court distinguished one of the overruled cases, State v. Martin, 33 as
having been decided under articl 357 of Louisiana's former Code of
Criminal Procedure, and noted that article 786 of the 1966 Code of
Criminal Procedure omits the restrictive provisions of the former code. 34
However, the court could not distinguish the other cases it overruled,
particularly the 1974 case of State v. Roquemore,35 in which defense
counsel had specifically urged the court to take a position similar to the
one it eventually took in the instant case. 36 The basis for overruling the
cases was found in the expansive language of Hills37 and the 1974
29. Defendant contended that a similar system of vote recordation by defense
attorneys would be prohibitively expensive and logistically impossible. But see
Campbell, The Multiple Functions of the Criminal Defense Voir Dire in Texas, I
AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 258 (1972).
30. 347 So. 2d 221, 223 (La. 1977).
31. Id. at 224.
32. See note 21, supra.
33. 250 La. 705, 198 So. 2d 897 (1967).
34. 347 So. 2d at 223. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 786: "The court, the state, and the
defendant shall have the right to examine prospective jurors. The scope of the
examination shall be within the discretion of the court. A prospective juror, before
being examined shall be sworn to answer truthfully questions asked him relative to
his qualifications to serve as a juror in the case."
35. 292 So. 2d 204 (La. 1974).
36. See note 21, supra.




The court in the instant case reaffirmed State v. Wright, in which it
had stated that "once defendant demonstrates that the information con-
cerning past jury experience is inaccessible to him and that the State
intends to use this information, he would have shown that the information
was necessary to prevent undue prejudice to his case, hardship or injus-
tice. ' 39 In Wright, defendant failed in a number of ways to meet the
requisite showing that would mandate discovery;' defendant made the
proper showing in the instant case but was premature in his contention of
unavailability."'
Louisiana courts have not been consistent in delineating the proper
scope of voir dire, although some inconsistencies are merely the result of
the court's case-by-case approach in this area.4 2 However, inconsistent
holdings on the right of the defendant to question veniremen on their
previous jury experience have resulted from the court's attempts to bal-
ance two policies which are sometimes irreconcilable. Many courts have
favored a wide scope of voir dire so as to facilitate the effective use of
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.43 However, Louisiana's
38. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17: "The accused shall have a right to full voir dire
examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily." La.
Const. of 1921, art. 1, § 10: "[W]hen tried by jury [the defendant] shall have the
right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be fixed by
law." The change was not intended to expand the existing scope of voir dire but
was rather meant to constitutionalize it, as the delegates were merely recognizing
the interdependence of the rights of peremptory challenge and full voir dire. See
Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA.
L. REV. 1, 57 (1974); Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1973, vol.
XIV (44th Day) 15; State v. Gomez, 319 So. 2d 424 (La. 1975).
39. 347 So. 2d 221, 223 (La. 1977).
40. See text at notes 22-24, supra.
41. Justice Tate dissented from the majority's holding that the trial judge
lacked the authority to order the state to relinquish the information in the absence
of a statute expressly providing for its disclosure. He argued that the supreme court
had always recognized the trial judge's authority, in the absence of contrary
statute, to regulate proceedings before him as an exercise of the court's power in
aid of its jurisdiction. The judge clearly should have the power in this case, Justice
Tate reasoned, because all members of the court agreed that the defendants had a
right to receive the information but only differed on the timing of its availability.
Moreover, obtaining the information through voir dire questioning does not
equalize the position of the parties, as it may prejudice the defendant if prospective
jurors react negatively to counsel's questions. Id. at 225.
42. See text at note 15, supra.
43. Aldridge v. United States, 282 U.S. 308 (1931); Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396 (1893); Babcock, Voir dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27
STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975); Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A
. [Vol. 38
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Code of Criminal Procedure restricts the scope of voir dire to questions
concerning the juror's "qualifications."" Therefore, if a question is ir-
relevant to whether a venireman is qualified to serve, a judge may properly
deny it, even though the question may be relevant to the educated use of an
attorney's peremptory challenges. The supreme court has sometimes dem-
onstrated the tension between these policies by reversing itself after a
rehearing on the issue of a question's relevancy. 45 The leading case on the
scope of voir dire, Hills, was itself the product of such a reconsideration
of a question's relevancy.
If the decision is not limited to its facts, Holmes may portend a more
liberal attitude on the part of the court toward other lines of questioning
that have been deemed irrelevant. Its overruling of prior jurisprudence
tends to rebut the suggestion that the court allowed the questioning merely
to avoid giving the defendant access to the state's records. Furthermore,
the court referred to the overruled cases as having been "supported by
neither statute nor reason. 6 These factors indicate that the state's posses-
sion and use of the records was not dispositive, and suggest that the instant
decision may have application to other factual situations.
Certainly, there is adequate evidence that a juror's verdict may be
influenced by any prior jury service he may have had. One study, although
the result of limited data drawn mainly from civil trials, concluded that
such a relationship did exist. 7 The study found that prior jury experience
serves as a point of reference for jurors, increases their feelings of
competence, and possibly plays a role in the selection of foremen. A more
extensive study of jurors" found that jurors with no previous jury service
were more likely to vote for acquittal than jurors with previous jury
experience. 49 Attorneys across the country have recognized the relevance
Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972); Spears, Voir Dire: Estab-
lishing Minimum Standards To Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975). See text at note 18, supra.
44. See notes 21 and 34, supra.
45. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 282 So. 2d 422 (La. 1973).
46. 347 So. 2d at 223.
47. Broeder, Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 1965 INS.
L.J. 138.
48. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 45 S.W. Soc. Scl. Q.
361 (1965).
49. Id. at 365: "Among responding petit jurors, associations between birth-
place, previous jury service, socioeconomic class, and a vote of guilty or not guilty
were significant at levels ranging from .001 to .02 per cent. Individually, previous
jury service and a birthplace in the Anglo-Saxon northern part of Louisiana pro-
duced proportionately a greater number of guilty votes than 'fresh jurors' (no
previous jury service) and a birthplace in the French southern part of the state."
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of such information to a juror's verdict in a subsequent case, 50 and it may
be inferred that prosecutors who collect such data also appreciate its use.
In some cases, courts have taken it upon themselves to include voting
records with other information on prospective jurors supplied to counsel. 51
Certainly some difficulty exists in trying to determine the exact
degree to which defendant may inquire into a prospective juror's prior jury
experience. The instant case will permit defendants "to ask prospective
jurors during voir dire questions such as: (1) Have you ever served on a
criminal jury before? (2) What was the charge in that case? (3) What was
the verdict in the case?, etc." 52 Significantly, however, the court never
stated that the defendant should be allowed to inquire into a specific
venireman's vote in a prior case, even though this was the precise informa-
tion the defendant wanted. If he is unable to make such an inquiry on
remand, the decision in the instant case will not have decided the issue
presented to the court. In holding that the defendant was premature with
his request of disclosure, the court certainly implied that he should be able
to elicit the information on remand.
Future cases may also arise which question the propriety of limiting
voir dire in other areas in which the state possesses information. In Wright
the state admitted that it had made notations of a juror's characteristics and
responses on voir dire in previous cases, in addition to keeping voting
records. 53 If the court is presented with a similar situation involving other
types of information in the future, it has a number of options. It may find
that the defendant failed to make a proper showing of the state's actual use
or possession of the information, or of prejudice or unfairness to the
defendant's case. 54 It may ban the use of all juror investigations, although
this would be difficult to police and may be unconstitutional." The court
may decide to expand the scope of voir dire as it did in the instant case.
Furthermore, if the court is unwilling to require the state to divulge these
records in their entirety, or if the state asserts that some of the information
50. See note 29, supra. See also A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 359 (1975); C. Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants:
Their Influence On Juries' Verdicts in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97 (R. Simon
ed. 1975); Katz, The Twelve Man Jury, 1968-1969 TRIAL 39 (1968).
51. A. GINGER, supra note 50, at 358; Katz, supra note 50, at-39; Mitchell, Voir
Dire and Opening Statement- the Defense Takes the Offense, 26 FED. INS. CNSL.
135, 142 (1976).
52. 347 So. 2d at 223.
53. State v. Wright, 344 So. 2d at 1015.
54. Id.
55. Moskitis, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror
Studies, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 597, 625-26 (1976).
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in the records may be subject to the work product privilege, the court'has
the alternative of requiring partial disclosure after an in camera inspection
of the records to delete non-discoverable items.
56
An additional option available to the court is the mutual pre-voir dire
disclosure of jury books. It has been argued that such a course, far from
being optional, is required by due process, and this reasoning has appar-
ently been adopted by at least two state courts.57 The fourteenth amend-
ment's guaranty of due process of law may be a proper ground for such a
decision in that it seeks to protect the reliability of the guilt determining
process and the dignity of the individual,5 8 and also enhances the appear-
ance of justice.59 Four federal courts and a District of Columbia appellate
court, however, denied the same request after an examination of the same
constitutional considerations.6I
Another constitutional ground supporting the mutual pre-voir dire
discovery of such records may be the sixth amendment's guarantee of an
impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community. 61 To the
extent that the state can obtain "prosecution minded" jurors and exclude
those favorably inclined toward the defendant, it can subvert a number of
policies that the sixth amendment is designed to implement. In any event,
it may become increasingly difficult to justify protecting the district
attorney's jury books as the use of them becomes more widespread and the
information in them increases.
James C. Hrdlicka
56. People v. Aldridge, 47 Mich. App. 639,209 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1973); see
also LA. CODE CRIM. P. 729.4(2).
57. People v. Aldridge, 47 Mich. App. 639, 209 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1973);
Losavio v. Mayber, 178 Colo. 184, 496 P.2d 1032 (1972). See Moskitis, supra note
55, at 624-34. Neither opinion explicitly examined either state or federal constitu-
tional provisions and both were extremely vague in enunciating the basis for their
decisions. Cf. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1966) (equal access
to state witness outside of court mandated by due process); State v. Hammler, 312
So. 2d 306 (La. 1975) (equal access to certain state witness mandated on right to
counsel grounds).
58. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
59. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 474 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 272 U.S.
510, 523 (1927).
60. United States v. Payseur, 501 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Costello, .255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.
1950); Christoffel v. United States, 171 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1948); Terrell v. United
States, 361 A.2d 207 (D.C. App. 1976).
61. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Moskitis, supra note 55, at 633;
but see Hamer v. United'States, 259 F.2d 274, 276 (9th Cir. 1958).
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